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Abstract                                                                                                                                                       
This article draws from the authors’ experiences of research in England on aspects of 
New Labour’s reforms in the field of child protection to counsel caution against 
standardisation processes currently underway in the Republic of Ireland. It is argued 
that such processes are deeply problematic when dealing with the complexity of child 
protection work. Alternatives to standardisation are offered drawing from the literature 
on systems design. Such alternatives are likely to build confidence and trust in services. 
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Introduction                                                                                                                                               
The title of this paper reworks the old nationalist dictum ‘England’s difficulty is 
Ireland’s opportunity’ to argue that there is an opportunity for Ireland to learn from 
England’s recent difficulties in child protection and to apply these lessons to proposed 
reforms of children’s services. Our particular interest in this paper is the implementation 
of a standardised business process project to ensure uniform recording and assessment 
processes (PA Consulting Group, 2009; Health Service Executive, 2009). 
 
We explore the paradox that, at a time where developments such as standardisation are 
under serious scrutiny in England, they are being embraced in Ireland.  We explore the 
similarities and differences between what is underway in Ireland and developments in 
England. We argue for, and offer suggestions towards, finding a way through which may 
help avoid the pitfalls of either a standardisation agenda or unfettered diversity resulting 
in a post code lottery.   
 
England: new public management, ‘deliverology’ and child protection 
A series of developments in England under New Labour led to a highly centralised 
‘command and control’ approach to regulating the activities of social workers in the 
area of child protection.  Alongside a reformulation of the role of the welfare state, there 
was also a continuation from the Conservatives of what became known as ‘the 
managerial partnership state’ (Featherstone, 2004). Although there were differences 
from the foregoing neoconservative agenda, New Labour’s infatuation with the methods 
of private business was, if anything, stronger.  Enabling, brokerage and regulating were 
emphasised over providing, and where the state did provide this was both targeted and 
subject to target setting.   
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New Labour’s approach to public administration provided the perfect medium for so-
called new public management (NPM) to flourish (Dillow, 2007).   Its ideological 
contours are that: a central elite know best; strong top-down management is the key to 
quality and performance; workers are self-interested and inefficient; the standardisation 
of processes and explicit targets drive quality and these are ensured by rigorous micro-
management using performance indicators (Chard and Ayre, 2010). In the context of 
human services and particularly child protection, NPM has been centrally concerned 
with managing institutional risk (Munro, 2009), creating a climate of ‘targets and terror’ 
(Bevan and Hood, 2006).   
 
It is impossible to understand the genesis of the reforms to child welfare in England 
without understanding the key policy mantras as outlined above. Moreover, they are 
proving very difficult to destabilise, despite a range of compelling critiques. 
 
Transforming children’s services post Climbié  
The reform of children’s services was accelerated in 2000 with the death of Victoria 
Climbié (Laming, 2003), but as we shall see from its unmistakable family resemblances, 
its progenitors are NPM and performance management.  Victoria died in London as a 
result of long-standing cruelty at the hands of her great aunt and her partner. Her death 
prompted a highly influential inquiry into professional and institutional failure. As a 
result, government put in place a series of reforms drawing heavily upon concepts of 
‘business process management’, electronically enacted through the Integrated 
Children’s System (ICS) (Shaw et al., 2009; White et al., 2010). The ICS attempts to 
micro-manage practice through the imposition of a detailed, work-flow model of the 
case management process and other processes, as figure 1 demonstrates. 
 
Many of Laming’s broad diagnostics of the failures contributing to Victoria’s death are 
accurate enough. However, his relative neglect of human, interactional and social 
factors means that the policy responses, particularly the standardised processes and 
‘information sharing’ initiatives, have been based on a set of erroneous assumptions. 
The most notable of these is that catastrophic child deaths are substantially the result of 
professionals failing to record or share information.  Such failures are not trivial, but in 
our view rarely are they causal. Rather, they are ubiquitous features of many cases 
which do not end catastrophically, as Wastell notes: 
 
[T]o be sure that this evidence is decisive, we need to know how often it was 
present in other cases but did not lead to calamity. ... Unless it can be shown … 
that assessments, information gathering and multi-agency collaboration were 
conspicuously worse in the serious cases, how can it possibly be claimed that 
these were critical causal features? (Wastell, 2011). 
 
For the causal factors in the death of Victoria, we need to look elsewhere. A re-
examination of some of the evidence submitted to the Climbié inquiry will illustrate our 
point. 
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Figure 1: Referral and assessment process as officially charted in the ICS. The diagram 
is adapted from the Children’s Social Care Services Core Information Requirements 
Process Model (DCSF, August 2008). The diagram covers the first quarter of the 
process model for “Core case management operations”. It is one of 11 such models!  
Human factors in child protection: The Laming Inquiry revisited 
In July 1999 Dr Schwartz, consultant paediatrician at Central Middlesex hospital, 
examined lesions on Victoria’s body. Her clinical opinion was that the marks were self-
inflicted due to intense itching from a scabies infection. This opinion differed from a 
previously expressed and documented diagnosis by a locum registrar, who produced 
detailed body maps of Victoria’s injuries and was of the view that there was a strong 
possibility that she had been physically abused. Whilst Dr Schwartz testified to the 
inquiry that she had made it clear to social services that she could not exclude physical 
abuse, the production of a medical explanation for some of the injuries proved a highly 
consequential red herring. The contact with social services to inform them of the 
‘change’ of diagnosis was made by Dr Dempster, a junior doctor unfamiliar with social 
services and the child protection system. 
 
Dr Dempster followed up several unsatisfactory conversations with social workers with 
the following letter: 
“Thank you for dealing with the social issues of [Victoria]. She was admitted to 
the ward last night with concerns re: possible NAI [non-accidental injuries]. She 
has however been assessed by the consultant Dr Schwartz and it has been 
decided that her scratch marks are all due to scabies. Thus it is no longer a child 
protection issue. 
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There are however several issues that need to be sorted out urgently: 
1) [Victoria] and her mother are homeless. They moved out of their B & B 
accommodation 3 days ago. 2) [Victoria] does not attend school. [Victoria] 
and her mother recently arrived from France and do not have social network 
in this country. Thank you for your help” (cited in Laming 2003, p. 251). 
 
The letter’s communicative intent was to prompt a visit to the hospital by a social 
worker, but was read by social services as a recategorization of the case, triggering a 
quite different organizational response. Brent children’s services had two initial 
assessment teams: referrals were considered first by the duty team, and if the referral 
appeared to relate to ‘a child in need’, the case would remain with them for initial 
assessment; if there were child protection concerns, it would be transferred to the child 
protection team for urgent action. Under the Children Act, 1989 and the associated 
guidance, the category of child in need was introduced to signal the importance of 
offering support to families with a range of needs such as housing. This was intended to 
ensure that local authorities did not just focus narrowly on immediate harms. Thus, 
within the assumptive world of Brent Social Services, the crucial line of this letter 
becomes ‘Thus it is no longer a child protection issue’ and not the documented ‘urgent’ 
social matters. The case thus entered a bottle neck in an over-stretched duty team, 
dealing with backlog of 200-300 cases a week. Whilst these circumstances are clear, 
such formal organizational systems escaped Laming’s criticism, indeed he prescribes 
more of them (White, 2009a). 
 
If we examine the events at Central Middlesex from the point of view of the human 
actors, it is clear that complexities arise from the need to pass what might be speculative 
and ambiguous information across service boundaries. Communications within a system 
are embedded in a range of interpretive dichotomies: signal/non signal; 
information/noise and pattern/randomness (Serres, 2007). One reader/hearer may find 
information, where another detects only noise. For the receivers of the referrals, the 
categories ‘non accidental injury’ or ‘child protection case’ were the signal, the genuine 
deliberations of the doctors simply noise. There were plenty of instances of information 
sharing in the Climbié case, but signal and noise were frequently confused. 
 
Research shows that knowledge sharing is influenced by multiple interpersonal, social 
and organisational factors, including the inhibitory impact of disparate knowledge 
domains, social hierarchy and low trust (e.g. Cross and Borgatti, 2004). Information 
throughout child welfare is thus ‘slippery’ (difficult to codify) and ‘sticky’ (difficult to 
share across boundaries). The problem is not readily responsive to exhortations to ‘share 
information’ (Swan and Scarbrough, 2001; Reder and Duncan, 2003). Yet, this is 
exactly what Laming prescribes. The system wasn’t working to support safe practice, 
yet the prescription was a stronger dose of the same medicine – a rigid workflow, 
cumbrous forms and centrally imposed timescales. 
 
The death of (Baby) Peter Connolly in 2007, and the media attention it attracted, opened 
the Laming reforms to renewed scrutiny. Peter was a 17 month infant, subject to a child 
protection plan, supervised, like the Climbié case, by the London Borough of Haringey. 
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Both the hospital and the social work staff were too willing to believe the 
plausible accounts the mother was offering to explain child A’s injuries. In the 
more holistic context of the case the explanations offered by Ms A should have 
been questioned (Department for Education, 2010).  
 
The quotation above is taken from the Serious Case Review (SCR) into Peter’s death. 
Throughout extensive professional involvement, Peter continued to sustain multiple 
injuries, as the SCR panel reports above. His death took place years after the 
implementation of the Laming reforms, which were to ensure that ‘this could never 
happen again’. 
   
So, how could it happen again? How can apparently reasonable and motivated staff 
make repeated errors in the attribution of cause and effect and fail to see what was 
happening right under their noses? An examination of the literature on human factors in 
decision-making shows this to be not very surprising at all, the post Laming reforms 
simply failed to take proper account of these factors. The intrinsic characteristics of 
information processing by human beings operate as both friend and foe in social work 
decision-making.  At an individual level, we are equipped with an innate apparatus to 
assess our fellow human beings on an intuitive/emotional level, and alongside this we 
have particular cognitive biases. The generation of hypotheses is affected by our 
cognitive capacities in two principal ways: it is limited by what is available in memory, 
and by ‘psychological commitment’ to the first hypothesis. This is confounded by the 
related tendency to seek out evidence that confirms a hypothesis, rather than searching 
for ‘disconfirming’ evidence (Wolf et al., 1985). Thus, once we have settled on an 
interpretation of events we tend to deviate little from our initial ‘anchor’ hypothesis 
(Kahneman et al., 1982). In Peter’s case the fallacious formulation was the result of 
professionals’ belief in his mother’s account of his behavioural difficulties, including 
‘head banging’, which was also observed by professionals - ‘confirmation bias’ in 
action. 
 
When we add to the equation the social psychological and sociological dimensions, 
which generate powerfully normative cultural practices, we have a heady cocktail 
indeed (Haidt, 2001; White 2009b).  It is clear that the failures in the case of Peter 
Connelly were not in sharing or recording information, but in having the time, space, 
argumentative flexibility, analytic ability and trusting relationships to debate and make 
sense of what was being seen and recorded. If we want safer child protection systems 
we are going to have to design them for the right species. 
 
In England, the policies implemented under New Labour were to result in a ‘perfect 
storm’: timescales, targets and the Integrated Children’s System (ICS). It became 
apparent that a key casualty of these ‘reforms’   was time spent with families. The audit 
tail was well and truly wagging the practice dog.  Rather than protecting against system 
failure, these factors exacerbated ‘latent conditions for error’ (Reason, 2000) because 
they made the work bureaucratically complicated whilst failing to take account of its 
human complexity. 
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The English system reassessed 
The ICS, with its form-based artefacts and rigid processes, was marked out for the 
urgent attention of a national ‘Social Work Task Force’, set up by the Labour 
government following the media furore evoked by the Peter Connelly case. Immediate 
relaxation of its strictures was recommended (Social Work Task Force, 2009). 
 
Further scrutiny of the system followed the general election in 2010 with establishment 
of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition.  Professor Eileen Munro was 
commissioned to scrutinise and advise on reducing bureaucratic burdens in children’s 
services. She concluded: 
 
... The demands of bureaucracy have reduced [social workers’] capacity to work 
directly with children, young people and families. Services have become so 
standardised that they do not provide the required range of responses to the 
variety of need that is presented. This review recommends a radical reduction in 
the amount of central prescription to help professionals move from a compliance 
culture to a learning culture... (Munro 2011, pp. 6-7). 
 
Munro recommends that services are redesigned using ‘socio-technical’ principles (see 
below), with due attention to the role of professional judgement. These well-established 
principles have been used to good effect in healthcare systems exemplified in the patient 
safety movement (inter alia Dekker, 2007; National Patient Safety Agency, 2011).   
 
In the next section, we will change lenses, taking a wider view of the problematics of 
the attempts to standardise responses in England. We shall see that its failure was far 
from singular or unpredictable. From the perspective of the research literature on 
business process management (BPM), its vicissitudes were entirely foreseeable.   
 
Horses for courses and the limits of the BPM paradigm   
We have noted above that the failures of the English reforms were quite predictable. 
BPM is not a magic bullet, indeed as many as 80% of BPM initiatives fail (Trkman, 
2010).  Moreover, the critical success factors have been well investigated and are ably 
reviewed by Trkman (2010). The degree to which processes can be validly standardised 
is one such factor, indeed it is decisive. Technologies for process management will only 
be effective for standard, routine processes and it is vital to distinguish between these 
and non-routine counterparts (Wastell, 2011); put simply, the message is ‘do not 
standardise processes that cannot be standardised!’ Lillrank and Liukko (2004) neatly 
capture this distinction in their “Quality Broom” metaphor (figure 2). 
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Figure 2: “Quality Broom” metaphor (Lillrank and Liukko, 2004) 
 
Lillrank and Liukko argue that non-routine processes differ from standard routines “in 
that input is vague and not readily classified into categories. ... Therefore the assessment 
of an input is an interpretation which must be derived through the search for new 
information, iterative reasoning, and trial-and-error” (ibid. p. 42).  Whereas standard 
processes can be managed directly through procedural or technological means, “non-
routine processes are best managed by indirect means, such as competence, professional 
values, visions and missions” (ibid., p. 44). Through culture, in other words (Mannion et 
al., 2009). Or as Weick (1987, p. 124) put it:   
“Either culture or standard operating procedures can impose order ... but only 
culture also adds in latitude for interpretation, improvisation, and unique action” 
Much of the professional task of social work lies at the “brush” end of the quality 
broom, which explains ‘in a sweep’ why process standardisation was always the wrong 
approach. 
 
Another way of characterising these crucial issues is the process/practice dichotomy 
(Wastell, 2011). ‘Process’ can be defined as a formal set of sequential steps  whereby 
some output  is produced, whereas ‘Practice’ refers to the activity of getting the work 
done, the artful performance of a craft. In social work, the former may be recording a 
contact with a service, the latter the work with the family and the sense-making 
involved. Although written in relation to a different professional task, that of software 
development, one of us argued some time ago that the belief that formalised processes 
can magically substitute for skilled practice represents a form of fetish (Wastell, 1996). 
Software engineering went through its standardisation ‘turn’ over a decade ago, and the 
comparison with social work is instructive. Standard processes were introduced in the 
form of “structured methodologies” (Wastell, 1999). The effort failed, making way for 
the development of alternative approaches (agile methods) which gave full space for the 
virtuosity and creativity of individuals, imposing only a minimum of structure. Social 
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work in the UK is learning now, sadly the hard way, what software engineering learned 
over a decade ago. 
 
The argument encapsulated in the quality broom metaphor, is thus not for or against 
standardisation, but for a recognition of the diversity within a system. 
Managers need to decide what should be strictly regulated and what should be 
left to empowered individuals and groups ... A great deal of trouble follows, if 
processes are interpreted as being different from what on closer examination 
they really are (Lillrank and Liukko, 2004, p. 45). 
Taking these insights, what are we to make of the Irish reform programme? Has it been 
designed after careful analysis of Irish social work’s ‘broom’? Does it take account of 
human factors? Is it based on a thoroughgoing analysis of the causal factors in Ireland’s 
high profile cases, or does it repeat the ‘strong but wrong’ assumptive base of the 
English model? 
 
What’s happening in Ireland? 
Irish social work has seen a steady, incremental process that has broadly 
followed and adopted the international trends and key themes in the quality 
programme: raised scrutiny, procedural compliance, accountability (defined in 
financial terms), practice standardisation, inspection, and, more recently, audit in 
the form of compliance with agreed agency requirements’ ( Kemp, 2008, p.  
101).    
 
However, Kemp noted that while there were similarities with the UK, the scale and 
scope of the quality programme at the time he was writing was far less intense and 
focused. Moreover, he noted the interesting paradox that the more attempts were made 
to standardise control, the more divergent practice appeared to become. For example, 
the advent of Children First: National Guidelines for the Protection and Welfare of 
Children (Department of Health and Children, 1999) was seen as a significant attempt 
to standardise the way social workers worked, how and who they liaised with, and how 
they accessed child welfare concerns. However, as soon as the document had been 
launched, variations were adopted by each Health Board. Indeed, instead of 
standardising practice, it merely led to greater degrees of divergence and localised 
arrangements. This finding is important in understanding the latest attempts at 
standardisation in Ireland (see PA Consulting, 2009).       
 
However, as in the UK   the catalyst for much of what has happened  has been key 
inquiry reports including The Report of the Kilkenny Incest Investigation (McGuinness, 
1993), The Ferns Report (Murphy et al., 2005), Ryan Report, (2009) and the 
Roscommon Child Care Case (2010). These raised public awareness, increased 
demands for better protection and placed child protection social work under increased 
scrutiny.  This created a heightened focus on, and pre-occupation with, procedures 
which sought standardised responses and individual social worker accountability. 
The Irish Social Services Inspectorate and, more recently, the Health Information and 
Quality Assurance agency (HIQA) have been promoting developments in relation to 
audit, quality insurance, inspection, effectiveness and efficiency over the last decades.  
Since 2005, Buckley (2008) notes there have been increasing manifestations of the New 
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Public Management (NPM) approach.  For example, there is increased attention to 
performance indicators, with Section 8 reports identifying how many child protection 
conferences were held where parents and children were invited, the numbers where they 
attended, the number of reports received by category, the number of initial assessments 
conducted, and the number of cases where initial assessment led to listing on the Child 
Protection Notification System.  However, as Buckley notes, there is no explanation of 
what these indicators demonstrate.  Furthermore, they contrast with the Analysis and 
Commentary Sections of the Section 8 reports, which give a much fuller and more 
complex picture of the varying meanings that can be attached to all these indicators.   
   
At the time of writing the HSE is rolling out the National Child Care Information 
System (NCCIS), which is to be implemented nationally in all Child and Family Social 
Work departments (Health Service Executive, 2009). While the NCCIS encompasses all 
areas of Child and Family services, the part of this new system which is of particular 
concern is the Business Process Standardisation Project. It sets out a national standard 
framework for recording and for monitoring how Child and Family Social Workers do 
their work. The standard forms encompass every aspect of the work from referral, initial 
assessment, further assessment, family support and children in care and must be filled 
out within specified timescales. We would suggest there are obvious similarities with 
the ICS work-flow mode.   
 
But what problem is this focus on standardisation addressing in Ireland? If we explore, 
for example, what happened in the Roscommon case (the most recent case to cause 
concern) it is not clear at all that a focus on standardising processes is of value. In this 
case of long-standing sexual abuse and  neglect, what emerges is a complex and 
interrelated constellation of issues involving cognitive ‘errors’, the conventions of 
telling and the gendered nature of control issues in families.  Categorisation of this case 
as family support operated to locate interventions at the support end of the continuum 
and this was exacerbated by the secretive nature of child sexual abuse and gendered 
practices around control. As has been well documented, children who are being sexually 
abused are seldom able to open up in any straightforward sense. Wattam (1999) has 
argued for the importance of attending to the conventions of information exchange in 
routine and non-routine encounters. Most people, children included, operate with a 
hierarchy of who should be told what, and in what order. For example, where there is a 
death in a family, there are usually conventions about who should be told first, and if 
these are not adhered to, ill-feeling and distress may ensue.  Research with children and 
young people suggests they operate with a strong sense of who they want to tell what to, 
and sexual abuse by parents can impact profoundly on their sense of what is the right 
thing to do. For example, if a child is unable to tell their mother about a father’s abuse, 
then it is unlikely that they will easily flout the convention (about who is first in line). 
To put it bluntly, if those they want to trust with bad news cannot be told, then it is 
possible they will tell no one at all. Therefore, in such cases standardised protocols that 
emphasise social workers seeing and talking to the child are unlikely to be of value. 
 
Overall, many of the most high profile scandals in Ireland have involved sexual abuse 
either in families or in institutions.  The Ryan Report (2009) offers a shocking 
indictment of failures in relation to inspection and audit. However, these can only be 
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understood within the culture of deference to the Catholic Church, and societal attitudes 
to those who were poor and/or considered morally depraved. 
 
Conflicts around care and control can characterise many cases where a range of abuses 
are occurring and these are often gendered in nature. The father in the Roscommon case 
was noted in the Inquiry Report to control interventions with workers and much practice 
seemed to take place on his terms and his territory. The knowledge base in relation to 
working with such men, and the dynamics of the relations they establish with women, 
are poorly researched and understood and, indeed, we would argue constitute a serious 
gap currently.  It goes without saying that standardised protocols are of little value in 
such situations as this is highly complex work (Featherstone, 2011).  Moreover, there is 
evidence to suggest that work with men is particularly prone to the kinds of cognitive 
errors explored above, where they are categorised at an early point as a risk to the child 
(or resource) with such categorisations becoming fixed and  not open to revision.    
 
A small scale consultation carried out by one of us with a team involved in 
implementing the standardisation project in Ireland suggests that it does support 
measures to improve audit. For example, it was easier for managers to see at a glance 
how many referrals had come in and what had happened. Moreover, unlike the infamous 
ICS system, the forms lent themselves to a narrative approach. However, even at such 
an  early stage of  ‘roll out’  concerns were being expressed about the need to have 
separate forms per child, and the  apparent prescription in relation to the timing of case-
conferences.  The latter is not just of concern in terms of tempering professional 
discretion in relation to when the conference might be most valuable, but such 
conferences can be extremely intimidating events for parents and should arguably only 
be held when it is clear that they will be of value,  rather than to fit with a specific 
timescale. A separate issue beyond the scope of this paper is that prescription in relation 
to case-conferences could impact unhelpfully on whether more strengths-based 
approaches such as Family Group Conferences are held.    
 
Discussion and conclusion: There is an alternative 
Social work is not unique as a professional activity, though it does have distinctive 
aspects, and in looking for different ways of designing social care organisations, it 
behoves managers and policy-makers to draw on the commodious literature on 
organisational design. In these evidence-based times, managers must surely practise 
what they preach for others.     
de Sitter et al. (1997) identify mounting uncertainty and complexity as key challenges 
for all organisations, for which two broad options are available. The first is to increase 
internal complexity, through the creation of more staff functions and processes and, 
therefore, more sophisticated management control structures. They dub this the strategy 
of “complex organisations and simple jobs”. The second response takes the opposite 
tack, reducing control and coordination by the creation of self-contained units. 
Fragmented tasks are to be combined into larger wholes, thinking to be re-united with 
doing; in other words, a strategy of “simple organisations and complex jobs”. 
Effectively, the latter response follows a long-established design approach known as 
sociotechnical systems design (STSD), mentioned above (Wastell, 2011).  Several key 
principles characterise the approach. First, that organisations should be seen as open 
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systems, comprising (for analytic purposes) two sub-systems, the ‘technical’ 
(technology, skills and processes) and the ‘social’ (motivation, job satisfaction, 
organisational and group culture). STSD seeks “Joint Optimisation” of these sub-
systems, i.e. the search for a mutually-reinforcing balance between what workers need 
and want, and the technical requirements for effective performance. Other principles 
include: Minimum Critical Specification (no more should be specified than is absolutely 
essential) and the Sociotechnical Criterion (responsibility for dealing with contingencies 
to be given to workers, not supervisors or managers).  Put simply, do not over-specify, 
delegate as much as safety and accountability will allow, liberating people to innovate 
and adapt to unpredictable situations’. 
 
The success of the “simple organisations, complex jobs” approach is attested in the 
vignette of Mutual Benefit Life, a US insurance company (Hammer, 1990). Its old 
process was bureaucratic and labyrinthine: insurance applications could go through 30 
discrete steps, spanning five departments, taking up to 25 days. A new approach was 
needed: departmental boundaries were swept away and a new position created, the case 
manager: 
Case managers have total responsibility for an application from the time it is 
received to the time a policy is issued. Unlike clerks, who performed a fixed task 
repeatedly under the watchful gaze of a supervisor, case managers work 
autonomously. No more handoffs of files and responsibility (ibid., p.106). 
This is the epitome of STSD: complex jobs and simple organisation.  As a result 
applications were processed in four hours with case managers handling twice the 
volume of work.  There are examples of such redesign within social work, such as the 
Borough of Hackney’s “Reclaiming Social Work” initiative. Here the “process 
paradigm” was seen as part of the problem, not the solution: “With greater reliance on a 
procedural approach … a workforce often incapable of professional, creative and 
independent thinking had emerged (Goodman and Trowler, 2011, p. 161). Radical re-
organization along sociotechnical principles (small, autonomous work-groups) achieved 
the virtuous circle of improved outcomes (e.g. reduced children in care) at a lower 
financial cost (ibid; Munro, 2011).   
 
We have argued that the change programme in Ireland is uniquely placed to take 
account of what has happened in England. Services must be properly designed with full 
account of both ends of the quality broom. The developments in England, and the shape 
of those planned in Ireland,  privilege  the management of institutional risk over the 
improvement of practice.  Instead, we urge that future developments need to attend to 
the role of ‘trust’ in the delivery of human services. Smith (2001) makes an important 
distinction between trust and confidence.  Confidence refers to the general sense of 
safety and reliability that we invest in systems - having certain expectations in relation 
to professional roles and the regulatory frameworks governing these systems. Thus, for 
child care services, confidence would refer to the qualifications of those working in the 
system, expectations about their role and expectations about the frameworks which 
regulate and inspect what they do. Clearly, events in Ireland in recent years have led to 
concern about the reliability of the systems at a number of levels.  For example, it is 
difficult to have confidence when crucial information about children and young people 
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seems not to have been collected in a systematic way.  Confidence is at the ‘hard’, 
handle end of the quality broom, and can be supported by good systems. 
 
However, this must not be at the expense of trust which serves as a guide to 
interpersonal relationships where the outcome cannot be guaranteed and, indeed, where 
the possibilities of disappointment and regret are always present – the ‘soft’ end of the 
quality broom. If activities such as social work are to bring about positive outcomes in 
people’s lives, then trust is essential. First, many of those who need services will have 
experienced situations where their trust was betrayed very profoundly. This might lead 
to the conclusion that it is better to concentrate on developing systems based upon rights 
and entitlements.  Rights are a vital underpinning for children’s services, but rights are 
exercised in inter-personal encounters and services (including those based upon rights) 
mediated by people (Smith, 2001).  Research evidence suggests that how a service is 
delivered really matters in terms of whether people continue to access it. For example, 
young people constantly give feedback on the importance of how they are talked to by 
workers and whether they feel such workers are genuine.  Thus, whilst it is important to 
measure how many children attend the meetings that are held to discuss their care, it is 
just as important, if not more so, to devise meaningful measures that assess their level of 
participation and how they feel about the quality of those meetings.   
 
In order for risk to be assessed and change to happen, service users need to tell the truth 
(Smith, 2001). Whilst this may not always be possible, it is even more unlikely to 
happen if social workers are not able to build up relationships that are compassionate 
and truthful in return. Service users value and respond to those who are honest and can 
deliver the bad, as well as the good news, in a respectful manner.  Integral to the 
building of relationships is that workers have enough time to assess what is happening, 
to mull over differing versions of events, to weigh up conflicting sets of evidence and to 
elicit truthful accounts. This kind of work cannot be done by harried workers running 
from one case to another without the space to think. Good quality supervision is also 
necessary as the research on human cognition, explored above, suggests we are all 
prone to cognitive error, particularly when we are tired and emotionally overwhelmed.  
Supervision should offer a space to challenge judgements made and to process the 
emotions that will arise when dealing with painful and distressing situations. 
 
Trust and confidence are related but not the same, and systems that focus only upon 
confidence building can destroy the possibilities for developing the kind of trusting 
relationships we have described above (Featherstone, Coogan and Landy, 2010).  We 
would argue that Ireland should grasp the opportunity to embrace principles of system 
design which aim at building trust and supporting the front-line professional task, 
guarding against the seductive proxies for quality that timescales and targets produce. 
These create new arenas for blame and tend to spawn more of themselves in response. 
There is another way, and in this article we have outlined some of the ideas that are 
emerging as alternative principles.  We hope it contributes to the policy dialogues that 
are necessary to ensure confidence and trust in the systems developed in both countries. 
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